The Wisconsin Works (W-2) program changed the administrative structure for social welfare services delivery from county government administration to one that includes performance-based contracting and private sector management of programs. We present a theoretical discussion of government contracting and the implications of alternative contract structures for service provider behavior and performance. We then analyze W-2 contract design and management across four contract periods (1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005) as the state transitioned to a performance-based contracting regime. We find that the state made rational changes in the W-2 contract specifications and performance measures that should have improved contract efficiency and effectiveness over time, and service providers responded to these changes in allocating effort toward the achievement of priority performance goals. At the same time, deficiencies in program administration and contract management contributed to some contract and performance failures and setbacks.
Introduction
The Wisconsin Works (W-2) program is widely regarded as a pioneer in welfare reform, both nationally and internationally (Mead, 2004) . Although its dramatic effects on reducing welfare caseloads initially overshadowed other remarkable features of W-2, increasing attention is now being given to major changes made in the administrative structures for welfare services delivery. In 1997, concurrent with the introduction of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Wisconsin ended the county government monopoly on public assistance administration by inviting private sector agencies to compete for contracts to manage local-level programs. Performance-based contracting was also introduced as a primary mechanism for motivating and monitoring the performance of W-2 agencies. Thirteen private sector agencies in nine counties came to manage more than 70% of the W-2 caseload in September 1997. 1 Wisconsin is one of many states that have shifted to greater use of contracting for social welfare services delivery under TANF. These changes reflect, in part, the transformation of public assistance from a program that primarily determined eligibility for cash payments and managed participants' access to these benefits to one that now offers a range of services intended to eliminate individuals' need for public welfare. Before TANF officially took effect in Wisconsin, for example, the state had established contracts with public and private agencies to offer Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) services to help welfare recipients become employed. As Sanger (2003) noted, state and local governments have long outsourced these types of services (employment and training, case management) that are now a major component of TANF service strategies.
A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of contracting in welfare programs (GAO, 2002) reported extensive contracting out for TANF services delivery in nearly every state (except South Dakota) in 2001. Although employment and training, and job placement and support services are the most commonly outsourced services, some states (including Wisconsin) have also contracted out eligibility determination. Most of the contracted funds (88%) were in state-level contracts in 2001, and the GAO also reported that the majority of these contracts were cost-reimbursement; only one fifth of contracts made payments to contractors conditional on their performance related to specific program goals.
Although a few case studies of administrative changes under TANF have explored contracting relationships between governments and their service providers, scrutiny of contract specifications has been rare. Van Slyke (2003) interviewed 35 public managers and directors of organizations engaged in social service contracting in New York State and studied their contracts, audits, and related documents. He found that as public agencies increased contracting for services, their own staff were reduced, contributing to a lack of contract management capacity and oversight. Sanger (2003) reported that public officials were beginning to reexamine the structure and incentives of their contracts for welfare services delivery. Excerpts from her interviews with public officials and service providers in four cities highlighted performance measurement problems, intentional manipulation of performance data, and "perverse incentives induced by the structure of contracts" (Sanger, 2003, p. 39 ) Other state-level case studies of TANF program administration have primarily documented coordination problems among administrative bodies in the devolution of responsibility for welfare service provision to lower level governments (Liebschutz, 2000; Norris & Thompson, 1995; Weissert, 2000) .
Study Objectives and Approach
We likewise employ the case study method in our intensive study of performance-based contracting for social welfare programs in Wisconsin. Wisconsin's approach to implementing welfare services delivery has been considered for adoption in settings as distant and distinct as Israel (Schultze, 2006) , and its early implementation and evolution across four separate contract periods makes it a particularly interesting and informative case study. Yin (2003) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that "investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context," (p. 13) particularly when "the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." We use state policy memos, contract documents, W-2 administrative data, and unemployment insurance (UI) wage records in our qualitative and empirical analyses, taking advantage of the temporal variation in the design of state W-2 contracts to analyze the implications of contract design for program management and performance. We evaluate the performance of W-2 agencies primarily in terms of the outcomes defined by policy makers and incorporated into the performance-based contracts. Although the case study component of this research uses information from a single state, the central goal of our study is to draw out more general insights-theoretical and practical-concerning the design of new administrative structures and contracts for welfare services delivery and their implications for program outcomes and accountability in the administration of social welfare programs.
In the next section, we begin with a theoretical discussion and literature review that frames our analysis of government contracting decisions and contract design. We then apply these theories in our case study analysis of W-2 during four contract periods (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , tracing changes in the contract terms, administrative structures and service provider performance, and analyzing management and contract design problems in the transition to a performancebased contracting regime with public and private providers. We conclude with a discussion of policy options to improve contract design, agency performance, and accountability in public welfare programs.
Theoretical Models of Government Contracting
Governments make decisions about whether to contract out service provision (or to keep service delivery "in-house"), and how to structure contracts if a decision is made to privatize services. Research that has formally modeled government contracting decisions and processes suggests that the first of these decisions should not be made in isolation of the second, that is, without consideration of how the contracting process would work given the nature of the service and other relevant factors. In framing our case study analysis, we draw from influential studies on contracting that address these fundamental issues (Baker, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hart & Moore, 1988; Hart, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Kettl, 1993; McAfee & McMillan, 1989) .
Incomplete Contracts and Residual Rights of Control
In the case where a complete or comprehensive contract can be specified, the same outcome will be achieved through either government (in-house) provision or a contractual arrangement with a private provider (Hart, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1997) . In other words, under the assumption of contractual completeness, a public manager can arrange an employment contract with a government employee that fully specifies job tasks and performance expectations, or the government can establish a contract with a private provider that similarly defines job tasks and performance expectations completely for private sector employees.
In public welfare programs, however, it is particularly challenging for the contracting parties to fully specify relevant contingencies in a contract-the "states of the world" or unforeseeable circumstances that might affect contract outcomes-and to stipulate the course of action that should follow their occurrence. Hart and Moore (1988) explain that in situations where the states of the world are highly complex and the dimensions (or variables) are many, the transactions costs of writing an amply clear and enforceable contract are often simply Heinrich, too great. Drawing on Williamson's (1981) transactions costs framework, Brown and Potoski (2003) add that social services such as welfare require more specialized investments to produce them (asset specificity), and their outcomes or value added are more difficult to observe or evaluate (a lower level of service measurability), magnifying the challenges of writing an effective performance-based contract. In these circumstances, contract negotiations become critical, as the contracting parties determine the terms or mechanisms (cost-sharing provisions, performance incentives) that allow them to address the problems associated with contract incompleteness. Furthermore, if contract negotiations are recurring over successive periods in time, the contracting parties may acquire more information about the likelihood and probable effects of such contingencies or evolving circumstances, allowing them to develop more effective adjustments or provisions for these problems in future contracts.
The inability to specify a complete contract does not, therefore, imply that governments should not contract out more complex social welfare services. Rather, the contracting parties have to decide on the mechanisms that will allow them to address or compensate the associated contingencies or problems. The allocation of the residual (or uncontracted) rights of controlthat is, control of the assets used in-service provision and the authority or decision-making power for handling noncontracted contingencies-are critical to the contract outcomes. Some key factors likely to influence the determination of residual rights of control include risk, competition, verification and enforcement, and of course, the nature of the service itself, such as the importance of investments in quality innovations. Although empirical research on this subject is limited, a number of studies (Kettl, 1993; Romzek & Johnston, 2002; Sanger, 2003; Van Slyke, 2003) have found that a market with greater competition and a wide range of provider alternatives increases the benefits of privatization.
A Simple Linear Contract Model and Applications to Government Contracting
In designing an optimal contract, the government has to determine how the risks inherent in contracting will be shared between the government and private provider. In McAfee and McMillan's (1989, p. 35 ) general linear contract model:
τ is the total payment made by the government to the contracted provider; the proportion of final cost (c) paid to the provider is α; the proportion of the bid (b) paid is β, and γ is a fixed "bonus" payment. In a fixed-price contract, β = 1, and α and γ are set to zero, implying no risk (or variation in payment) on the part of the government; the contractor/ provider bears the full risk of cost overruns.
2 In an incentive contract, 0 < α < 1 and β = 1 -α; McAfee and McMillan (1989) specify γ = 0 in such a contract, although we would characterize this parameter more liberally, γ ≥ 0, to allow for a bonus payment that could be tied to a specific level of performance achievement by the contractor. In general, the degree of risk sharing that is stipulated in the contract between the government and private provider (through the choices of these parameters) will also determine the allocation of residual control rights (i.e., who bears responsibility for addressing problems associated with contractual incompleteness and unforeseen contingencies that affect costs and program outcomes).
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If a government is concerned primarily with minimizing its total cost, it will focus on choosing an optimal value for α, the cost-share parameter. A higher cost share (for the government) reduces the fraction of gains to the provider from reducing costs, so a higher value of α will moderate providers' incentives to reduce costs. At the same time, a higher value of α will also strengthen the providers' incentives for investing in quality. We expect that if providers are bidding competitively for contracts, the anticipation of a bonus (γ) will also influence the choice or negotiation of the cost-sharing parameter; a bonus payment will offset costs, and if tied to performance on quality measures (i.e., made variable), it could further boost incentives for quality innovations and investments.
From a strictly economic perspective, government is in a favorable position to assume a greater share of the risk, because at any given time, it is typically involved in many different activities, and risks (and costs) associated with any one activity are distributed across all taxpayers (i.e., risk pooling and spreading). 3 And in bearing more of the risk, the government should also pay less (a lower premium) for services delivered by private providers. However, government contracting does not occur in a political vacuum. Failed projects, cost overruns, and unintended consequences or outcomes take a political toll, even if unfairly attributed to government decision making that was appropriate at the outset. Thus, these political influences may compel government officials to be more risk averse than is socially or economically efficient.
Contract renegotiation and adjustments. In addition to options for risks sharing between contracting parties, the government can also pursue strategies to reduce or compensate for uncertainty in the contracting process, such as allowing for contract renegotiation. In effect, the government and provider incorporate into the original contract a mechanism through which, at a specific date or event, the contract terms can be revised. In the linear contract model, when costs (c) increase unexpectedly, the government could choose to renegotiate the cost-sharing parameter (α) or possibly compensate contractors affected by the contingency with a onetime payment (an increment to γ or through a performance bonus scheme). Knowing that the contract terms may be rewritten or adjusted in the case of unforeseen contingencies reduces the risks to both parties (to an extent depending on the specification of the cost-share parameter) and, thus, may also reduce the risk premium paid by the government (or the total contract costs).
There are, of course, important drawbacks to including provisions for renegotiation in the original contract. The fact that the contracting parties anticipate renegotiation, which effectively rescinds the original contract and establishes a new one, is likely to change their interests in the original contract negotiations. If the terms of renegotiation or revision are not constrained, the incentives for the provider to make relationship-specific investments or to invest more in quality innovations that are beneficial to consumers are likely to be dampened (particularly to the extent that the cost-sharing parameter is affected). The importance of stability in government-provider contracting relationships for the quality and continuity of services has been demonstrated both theoretically and empirically across a number of service domains (see, e.g., Heinrich, 1999; Milward & Provan, 2000) . Furthermore, in situations like the W-2 program where the service technology may be new, or where the providers may be new entrants to the field, start-up costs may be higher and the time to develop a functioning service model longer so that a shorter-term, effective horizon for a contract may increase risks for the provider. Heinrich, In lieu of contract renegotiation, another option for reducing uncertainty or handling unforeseen contingencies is to incorporate a mechanism for automatically adjusting expectations for contract outcomes or shared risks/costs at particular times or under specific circumstances during the course of a contract. This could come in the form of a formula that would adjust the cost-share parameter (α) or change the level of the fixed bonus payment (γ) that would be paid under these specific circumstances. In fact, the use of performance measures and incentives in contracts between governments and providers has become increasingly popular, in part because of the flexibility offered for balancing risks with rewards for improved performance.
Contract performance measures and incentives. If a government's objectives or interests are explicit and the total value of the services to be provided is a contractible performance measure, designing an optimal performance-based contract should be relatively straightforward. However, in public welfare programs (as in many other government domains), objectives are not always clearly defined, and there is often no single, verifiable measure of contractor performance that adequately characterizes the value of services provided. In these cases, a performance measure will neither create the right incentives for the service provider nor will it necessarily provide an accurate signal to the government of total value produced by the provider.
In incorporating a performance-based contracting regime into the linear contract model, we first define service value, ν, as a function of contractor actions (e) and a vector of random variables (ε) so that ν(e,ε). 4 A contractible performance measure (P) that closely corresponds to value would likewise be a function of contractor actions and some random component, P(e,ε). In addition, we now assume that γ is a variable bonus payment, tied to contractor performance by a rate, r, paid for each unit at or above the minimum performance level, P s , so that γ = r [P(e,ε) -P s ]. The modified contract model is as follows: τ = αc + βb + r [P(e,ε) -P s ]. As long as there is a strong, positive correlation between ν and P, the higher cost to the government of paying an incentive bonus for high levels of P should be reflected in a higher quality or value of services produced. In other words, the provider invests in quality, anticipating that the performance bonus award (γ) will offset the addition to costs (c) associated with making these investments.
However, empirical studies have confirmed how difficult it is to achieve such ideal measures in practice, with some finding weak or negative correlations between performance measures (P) and program impacts or value-added (ν) (Burghardt & Schochet, 2001; Heckman, Heinrich, & Smith, 2002) . These difficulties are magnified when efforts or actions of the contractor (e) are not fully observable by the government, and/or the interests and goals of government and provider diverge. Any efficiency gains achieved through a competitive market with a wider range of provider alternatives may be counterbalanced by inefficiencies generated by employees engaging in "gaming" activities that increase measured performance but not service value. And the problem is even more severe if high levels of performance (P) can be achieved while the provider skimps on service quality to keep costs (c) low.
Management capacity. Avoiding these problems and inefficiencies requires strong government capacity for effectively designing and managing a contracting process (assessing provider capabilities, negotiating contract terms, financial management, monitoring, and performance analysis) and may also require new levels of expertise or types of management tools (Kettl, 1993; Romzek & Johnston, 2002; Sanger, 2003; Van Slyke, 2003) . In their study of state social services contracting in Kansas, Romzek and Johnston found that the contracting process required exceptional capabilities and experience in advance planning, contract design, negotiation, and implementation that were not always present at the outset of the contracting relationship. Furthermore, the levels of capacity and resources required for effective contract management are also likely to be influenced by factors associated with contract completeness, such as the ability to anticipate contingencies and assess their influence on costs (c), to measure value (ν), and to separate providers' efforts (e) from outside influences or risks (e).
This theoretical discussion sets up a fundamental question that motivates our case study analysis: In the context of service quality that is difficult to measure, unforeseeable contingencies that may affect program costs and outcomes, and the additional demands placed on government capacity in designing and managing contracts in these circumstances, is the introduction of private sector competition and the use of performance-based contracts likely to produce a more (or less) effective and accountable administration of public welfare programs?
A Case Study of Performance-Based Contracting:
Wisconsin Works (W-2)
Background: The New Public Welfare Administration and Basic W-2 Contract Design
Until 1997, county social service departments in Wisconsin administered the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, and nonpublic employees were not allowed to determine eligibility or to handle case management for welfare recipients. In preparation for the onset of TANF, the state proposed to allow any public or private agency to bid to manage the program, including eligibility determination and the delivery of services in each of four program tiers (unsubsidized employment, trial jobs, community service jobs, or transition activities). This decision to award W-2 contracts on a competitive basis was made by planners to introduce market-like features that would "challenge the bureaucracy to reform," that is, to become more responsive and accountable for results (Mead, 2004) . In addition, performancebased contracting was advanced for both public and private providers, ending the practice of cost-reimbursement in which government bears all risk and reimburses in full welfare benefit payments, job training and administration activities, regardless of performance.
Before the first W-2 contracts were awarded, however, the Wisconsin legislature intervened and imposed a "right of first selection" rule. Counties could achieve the right to operate the W-2 program without having to compete with other public or private agencies, as long as they met specific criteria indicating their satisfactory performance under Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. 5 The program, thus, began with strictly limited competition-of the 72 Wisconsin counties, 67 earned the right of first selection. Private agencies were contracted to run the W-2 program in nine counties, including in Milwaukee County, where at the time nearly three quarters of all W-2 recipients were enrolled.
The state also built into the W-2 contracts a provision for biennial contract renegotiations, which, as suggested in the theoretical discussion, might operate as a mechanism for risk sharing or adjustment. In the face of changing economic conditions, legislative priorities, or budget constraints, the state could change contract awards and reallocate funding, modify performance expectations, or make other adjustments. Although a 2-year contract period limits the time for recovery of start-up costs for new providers and might discourage investments in quality that are not immediately realized, the W-2 right of first-selection rule could mute this concern to some extent by contributing to stability in governmentprovider contracting relationships.
The use of performance incentives that tie contractor payments to measured performance (γ = r [P(e,ε) -P s ]) should also influence the distribution of risks in W-2 contracts. The W-2 performance measures changed over time, ultimately including more than seven different measures. Agencies that failed to meet the base performance levels risked losing their contract with the state; at the same time, W-2 providers were given the opportunity to earn profits or bonuses (γ) to encourage bids to operate the program. Ostensibly, profits should also reward W-2 agencies for efficient management and support their investments in service innovations. Phase 1 (9/1997 Phase 1 (9/ -12/1999 ): High-powered incentives for caseload reduction. The 1997-1999 contract period opened the first opportunity for W-2 agencies to make profits in administering public welfare programs. Although the contracts required W-2 agencies to assume financial responsibility for any program costs exceeding the contract budget, they were not obligated to minimum spending levels, creating strong incentives to reduce costs (c).
Evolution of W-2 Contracts Over Four Contract Periods
Three levels of performance achievement determined incentive payments: base performance level, first bonus level, and second bonus level (see Table 1 ). Agencies achieving the first bonus level could keep up to 7% of unspent funds as unrestricted profits. If the unspent funds exceeded 7% of the contract budget, the remaining funds (after the initial distribution of profits) were divided between the state and the agency, with an additional 10% given to the agency as unrestricted profit. From the remaining 90% of funds, 45% was allocated to the agency for community reinvestment funds for services to needy people, and the other 45% was retained by the state (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 1999, p. 12) . The rules for the distribution of unspent W-2 contract funds were known to agencies at the beginning of the contract and provided a clear indication of the potential (or maximum) amount of bonuses and community reinvestment funds that they could earn. The prospect of large bonuses (or a high r, the rate paid for each unit at or above the minimum performance level), thus, served as a high-powered incentive for W-2 agencies.
It is also important to note, however, that in the first contract period, the criteria or measures (P) by which providers were judged were primarily process-oriented. These measures included the ratio of staff to clients, percentage of cases meeting full-activity requirements, percentage of clients with an employability plan, client participation in a high school equivalency degree program, and the development of contractual arrangements with faith-based organizations. The single outcome-oriented measure was the percentage of W-2 cases that returned to a W-2 grant after being placed in a job (Kaplan, 2000) . Consistent with the pre-Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act proclivity toward reducing welfare caseloads and the W-2 contract incentives to reduce costs, the overall administrative focus was on processing clients quickly (Mead, 2004) .
With funding fixed for the first contract period based on caseloads existing in August 1996, no minimum spending levels, and little emphasis on service quality, it is not surprising that contract underspending was significant. The initial budget allocation was based on an estimated 41,402 cash benefit cases; however, the actual caseload at the onset of W-2 in September 1997 was 23,182-only 56% of the projection-reducing provider costs (c) for cash benefits.
7 As a result, contractors' profits totaled $33.0 million, or 10.4% of contract value, with the five Milwaukee agencies earning $26.2 million. In addition, most W-2 agencies (62 of 75) readily achieved minimum performance (caseload reductions) to earn the right of first selection for the 2000-2001 contract. In effect, profit levels depended primarily on the number of program participants served and the unspent budget allocation (i.e., on low service provision costs).
Could some of the profits earned be attributed to the agencies' efficient or innovative management of W-2? Kaplan (2000) described the teaming and co-location of private W-2 agency staff with public employees who determined eligibility for food stamps, Medicaid, and new W-2 applicants in Milwaukee County as an important innovation that facilitated efficient client services. In addition, Dodenhoff (2002) reported activities-over and above state requirements-undertaken by Milwaukee agencies, including home and community visits, marketing campaigns, intensive services to promote employment retention, emergency hotlines, and other services to address the individual needs and challenges of welfare Heinrich, Choi / Performance-Based Contracting 417 recipients. Although empirically it is not possible to disentangle the effects of agencies' efforts (e) to achieve efficient and effective program operations from external factors, ε, (such as the strong economy) that influenced measured performance, P(e,ε), earlier analyses of welfare caseload declines by Mead (2000) suggested that more discretion for agencies, along with accountability requirements, likely contributed to some extent toward state welfare caseload reductions.
Another question to consider, however, is-why did the state of Wisconsin choose not to renegotiate early in the first-round W-2 contract to reduce its payments when it became apparent in September 1997 that the caseload was only a little more than half of the projected number? One explanation is that the contract reflected other organizational interests of both parties to the contract. For example, the profit allocation rule served not only as an incentive for motivating agency managers but it also promoted political interests in the success of the new program. Because the successful establishment of the W-2 program rested importantly on its initial achievements, the state needed to induce the cooperation of the private agencies and minimize their risks of failure. Furthermore, W-2 contracts are funded with both federal aid and state general purpose revenue, and the state must document that it has maintained a level of state-funded spending (approximately $168 million per year in this contract period) to continue receiving federal aid (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 1999).
However, concerns were subsequently raised about whether these large agency profits (a larger than anticipated fraction of total costs paid by the state, (τ)) were appropriate (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 1999) . Although the state regarded the surplus as evidence of the W-2 program's success in reducing costs (c), critics, including community welfare advocates and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), argued that the contract terms encouraged W-2 agencies to provide fewer services to needy people (to keep costs down) and rewarded them by transferring taxpayer dollars to agencies in the form of the resulting surpluses (Huston, 1998) . The second round of W-2 contracts responded to these issues.
Phase 2 (1/2000-12/2001) : Increased monitoring, restricted profits. The new provisions of the second round of contracting were aimed at increasing contract performance requirements and monitoring. These contract revisions came under the pressure of public opinion to improve accountability in the face of concerns about excessive agency profits. A key change under this new contract was the determination of performance achievements by outcomes-based standards (intended to better capture quality or service value, ν) rather than administrative actions oriented toward reducing caseloads.
The 2000-2001 W-2 contract included five measures of participant outcomes-employment rate, average wage rate, two job retention measures, employer health insurance benefits and two program process measures (see the appendix). W-2 agencies had to achieve the base performance level (P s ) for all seven measures to earn the right of first selection for the next contract period and to be eligible for a performance bonus. The base-level expected outcomes are shown in appendix.
In addition, the second-round contracts reduced the level of profits agencies could earn to a total of 7% of the contract amount (see Table 1 ). On achieving the base level of performance, agencies could retain 3% of the contract amount as a restricted-use bonus (for community reinvestment uses). By achieving a higher level of performance across all standards (the first bonus level), agencies could earn an unrestricted 2% bonus; another 2% of unrestricted funds were allowed on attaining the highest (second bonus) level. In effect, although more rigorous performance measures (P) were introduced, the rate of performance-based pay, r, was reduced, limiting the total amount of performance-based compensation, r[P(e,ε) -P s ], that could be earned. 8 The Milwaukee agencies' profits in the 2000-2001 contract period totaled $8.9 million-a profit rate of 3.5%, down from 8.5% in the 1997-1999 contract period.
It is also important to consider, however, the level of the performance standards, P s , set for the providers and how challenging they were. If it is relatively undemanding for agencies to achieve these standards and the risk of failure is minimal, the state should not be expected to pay a high-risk premium (r) that results in large bonuses to agencies who meet the standards. In fact, a majority of the 72 agencies achieved the highest level of performance across all standards in the 2000-2001 contract period. Only eight smaller counties failed to achieve the base performance level across these standards. The W-2 agencies' average performance on the entered employment rate was about 3% points above the national average, and their performance on the earnings gain measure was double the national average (see http://www.acf.hhs.gov//programs/ofa/). Thus, the reduction in available incentive payments might not only have helped to placate public concerns about excessive profit allowances but might also have signaled a move by the government toward a more efficient contracting arrangement (offering smaller bonus awards in light of the low apparent risks).
The efficiency and efficacy of W-2 contract administration also came into question when increased scrutiny of contracting agencies uncovered a series of improper billing problems, primarily from inappropriate use of funds in the first-round W-2 contracts. A state government review was initiated to determine whether W-2 funds intended to support those in need of public assistance in Milwaukee County were being used for other purposes, for example, to expand these agencies' business in other states. Investigations by the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (LAB) and the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development (DWD) found that private contractors, including Maximus and ESI, had billed the state for improper and questionable expenditures.
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Evidence to date suggests that the state's monitoring of agencies' financial management in the first period was lacking. The state had contracted with the Milwaukee Private Industry Council (PIC) to audit W-2 agencies' financial performance. 10 A LAB report (2001) criticized both the state and the PIC for failing to properly monitor the program and concluded that confusion about who was responsible to provide financial and program oversight of W-2 likely contributed to the abuses. The state subsequently responded to this criticism, explaining that "the initial focus of W-2 was on getting the program off and running. Scrutinizing W-2 expenses became more of a focus later" (Schultze, 2000) . An empirical study by Hefetz and Warner (2004) found that high levels of monitoring are key to successful government contracting, although they acknowledged that it does not come cheaply. The studies they cite estimate that the costs of monitoring average approximately 20% of total contract costs, although it is a portion of total contract costs (τ) that is rarely explicitly enumerated or negotiated (as in the case of W-2). One argument advanced about the monitoring problems in W-2 suggests that strict monitoring was forgone in an effort to induce the cooperation of agencies, allowing them considerable latitude to achieve program goals. Hefetz and Warner (2004) point out that good managers consider political climate, not only technical matters, in making these decisions. Yet in the absence of adequate monitoring, Heinrich, and with minimal first-round performance requirements and comfortable profit margins, private agencies' diversion of funds to uses that benefited neither W-2 clients nor the State was costly both politically and financially. Citing Jennifer Reinert, the former Secretary of Wisconsin's Department of Workforce Development, Dodenhoff (2002, p. 25) notes: "The negative perceptions created by ESI's problems were pervasive and lingering-among the public, legislators, advocates, W-2 participants, and other stakeholders."
Phase 3 (1/2002-12/2003) : Refining the W-2 contracts. Changes made in the W-2 contracting process during the third period again reflected the state's interest in improving contract management and fine-tuning contract provisions to increase service quality and efficiency. For example, one deficiency in the first two contract periods (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) was the determination of W-2 budget allocations based on caseloads at one point in time. In the effort to develop more accurate caseload (and cost, c) projections, the state changed its method for calculating the baseline W-2 budget to one based on average monthly caseloads in the prior 13 months (January 2000 through January 2001) (DWD, 2001 ). In addition, the state also factored in caseload characteristics such as barriers to employment (low education, disabilities) and adjusted the W-2 agencies' caseload estimates (and government payments) accordingly. 12 Significant changes were also made to the W-2 performance measures during this period. The state classified the performance measures into four categories: (a) priority outcomes for participants, (b) high-quality and effective case management services, (c) customer satisfaction, and (d) agency accountability (DWD, 2001) . A total of six new criteria were simultaneously introduced (see appendix). 13 For example, in response to the improper billing problems, "financial management" and "contract compliance" standards were added. 14 A "customer satisfaction" standard and new administrative standards for case assessments and processing were also adopted to encourage W-2 agencies to focus on meeting participants' needs. 15 Importantly, coupled with these changes, different weights were applied to the four categories of performance measures in determining bonus payments and the right of first selection, which is akin to varying the rate, r, paid for performance achievements on the various measures. These weights also differed according to the two levels of bonuses used in the contracts (bonuses with and without restrictions on their use) (DWD, 2001) . For the level one performance bonus, "the priority outcomes" performance measures were accorded a weight of 65%, and the other 35% was based on measures of the "delivery of high quality and effective case management services." The weights on performance standards for level two bonuses were slightly different from those of level one, including a small allotment for customer satisfaction. 16 All performance measures were calculated based on data for the 24-month contract period, and provisions were also made to adjust for risks associated with local labor market conditions (DWD, 2001 ). Performance benchmarks (or targets) were adjusted when high unemployment rates were recorded during a period of at least 3 months.
In general, these changes are consistent with provisions that, in theory, should improve contracting relationships between the state and W-2 agencies. For example, categorizing performance measures and assigning different weights (or rates of compensation, r) to them that signal the government's program priorities should generate more cogent incentives for service providers. In addition, the adjustments for W-2 caseload characteristics and local economic conditions should lower agencies' risk of poor performance because of factors that are outside the control of program managers (ε). And to the extent that the new performance measures-particularly those given greater weight-are more strongly correlated with the impact or value (ν) of the W-2 services being contracted out, program outcomes for W-2 participants should be improved through managers' focus on achieving these standards.
However, as the state worked to develop a more accountable W-2 contracting system and to improve program quality, the legislature imposed substantial constraints. These problems were driven in part by a disparity between the biennial budget fiscal years (i.e., July 1, 2001 to June . In effect, the budget for the previous 6 months of the W-2 contract became subject to the outcome of the next round of biennial budget act negotiations, to the extent that the state could be forced to rewrite the W-2 contract for the final months of the contract period, changing the contract terms (α, β, and r) retroactively.
How does this external imposition of mandates by the legislature affect agencies' incentives and their performance? The 2001-2003 Biennial Budget Act reduced the final amount of performance bonus and community reinvestment funds available (γ) by about $2.0 million in performance bonuses (DWD, 2002) and $1.99 million in community reinvestment funds (DWD, 2003b) . Furthermore, the bonuses earned during the 2002-2003 contract period would not be paid until about 1 year after the end of the contract. These changes contributed to considerable uncertainty not only about the rate or level (r or γ) of performance bonuses to be paid but also whether they would be paid, particularly in times of tight budgets and weak economic conditions. In theory, one would expect that the prospect of lateperiod contract revisions and the breach in the link between agencies' performance and the amount of performance bonus they can earn could have a negative impact on agencies' motivation to achieve performance goals. The performance standards were similarly scaled back; the priority outcome "earnings gain" and "job retention" performance measures are now used only for bonus allocations, if performance bonus funding becomes available (see appendix). In effect, the contract incentives-a primary administrative tool for steering W-2 agencies-were retracted in this period, and the state's administrative focus reverted to securing basic W-2 benefits and job placement services for clients.
Implications of Contract Design for Financial Performance and Program Outcomes
Of ultimate interest to the state and other stakeholders in public welfare programs are the consequences of contract design and management for financial performance and program outcomes. Because information on provider performance was limited primarily to process Table 2 shows significant differences in the performance outcomes of W-2 agencies between these contract periods. The number of agencies that met base performance levels for all the standards declined dramatically in the 2002-2003 contract period, down from 63 (89%) to just 29 (43%) of the agencies. Table 2 also shows the number of performance standards that agencies failed to meet. Although only 5% of the agencies failed to meet more than one standard in the 2000-2001 period, this proportion climbed to more than a quarter (27%) of the W-2 agencies in the 2002-2003 contract period.
These two contract periods were also remarkable for the changing financial positions of contracted agencies. Before 2000, caseload declines were dramatic; then, caseloads began to gradually increase, in part because of a worsening economy. The 8,483 participants in the W-2 program in 2000 increased by 30%, to 11,198, in 2003 , and the cash benefit portion of the caseload grew, contributing to accelerated spending by W-2 agencies. At the same time, W-2 contract budgets were not adjusted upward as the caseload increased. In August 2003, the state announced that one of the five original private agencies operating W-2 in Milwaukee County, YW Works, would cease providing services at the end of 2003 (Schultze, 2003a) . YW Works overspent its W-2 allocation, resulting in an estimated $10 million deficit at the end of 2003. These financial troubles extended to other agencies, and by 2003, the deficits were overwhelming. The total projected budget deficit reached $30.1 million, in contrast to the $26.2 million in profits recorded by the Milwaukee agencies during the 1997-1999 contract period.
A reasonable question to ask is what happened to these agencies' profits from the first two contract periods? If the state had not allowed the distribution of these profits to the agencies, it might have been able to cover the 2003 shortfall with the unspent money from the earlier contract periods. Alternatively, agencies could have shrewdly set aside some of the unrestricted profits in anticipation of future needs or contingencies. Should the state "bail out" these agencies after their failure to internalize risks associated with uncontrollable (but not necessarily unexpected) factors (ε), such as the worsening economy and the reverse of caseload declines?
If contractors were being unfairly burdened with higher costs and risks in the 2002-2003 contract, one might also expect that service quality/effectiveness would suffer during this period. Although the numbers in Table 2 suggest that agency performance was declining, it is important to recognize differences in how performance was evaluated (criteria and target levels) in these two periods (2000-2001 and 2002-2003) and to consider how measurement and management changes in the system may have affected measured performance (P). Table 3 shows the number and percentage of W-2 agencies that achieved the base level of performance for each performance standard in the two contract periods. Among these, the target performance levels were the same across contract periods for the first five (of seven) priority (or most highly weighted) measures shown in Table 3 . Although it appears that the W-2 agencies' 2002-2003 performance fell slightly short of 2000-2001 achievements on these five measures (entered employment, job retention for 30 and 180 days, full and appropriate engagement, and basic education activities), the differences are small and statistically negligible. Alternatively, agencies' performance on the average wage/earnings gain rate measures declined between the two contract periods (from 100% to 42% of agencies achieving base performance levels). The W-2 agencies began their 2002-2003 contracts with earnings gains as a required performance measure, but the state changed it to an "information-only" standard midway through the contract period. 17 This raises an important question: Did the differences in contractor performance between these two periods for this latter priority outcome measure reflect genuine differences in participant outcomes? Although the state used different performance measures to assess wage/earnings gains across these contract periods, W-2 administrative data and wage records allow us to compute contractor performance using the same measure from one contract period to another. In this analysis, we use the earnings gain measure developed by the state for the W-2 program, that is, the difference between participants' earnings in the end quarter versus the first quarter of W-2 participation.
18 Table 4 presents results from simple descriptive and linear regression analyses using this earnings gains measure. Panel A of Table 4 shows the mean (agency-level) earnings gains for these contract periods (in constant 2003 dollars). Looking at these results, it is apparent that there are no substantive (or statistically significant) differences in mean agency outcomes (earnings gains) across the two periods. Figure 1 likewise shows that the distributions of earnings gains are also very close for these 2 periods.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the results from fixed-effect, agency-level regressions with the W-2 earnings gains measure as the dependent variable and three alternative specifications:
Heinrich, Choi / Performance-Based Contracting 423 (a) contract period indicators only, (b) contract period indicators plus a control for economic conditions (county/area unemployment rates), and (c) contract period indicators and controls for the unemployment rate and agency caseload characteristics. In these regressions, the base 424 The American Review of Public Administration (omitted) contract period is the first one (9/97-12/99); thus, the coefficients on the 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 contract period indicators estimate the increment or decrement to earnings gains for participants in these periods relative to the base period. What is most noteworthy about these results are the negligible or statistically insignificant differences in agency performance on the earnings gains measure from one period to the next. Controlling for average participant characteristics and unemployment rates makes the 2002-2003 contract period performance on earnings gains look poorer ($178 less than the base period, compared to $93 less in [2000] [2001] , although again, these differences are not statistically significant, and thus, should not be interpreted as differences in earnings gains across the contract periods. In other words, the differences in measured performance achievement from the 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 contract periods shown in Table 3 do not appear to reflect real differences in average agency earnings gains.
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In summary, considering the W-2 agencies' performance across each of the measures shown in Table 3 and the relative emphasis placed on them in the performance calculations (r[P(e,ε) -P s ]) in the two contracts, it appears that the agencies focused their efforts (e) on the measures that were accorded the greatest weight (r) in the contracts, as our earlier theoretical discussion would predict. On the performance measures that were established as (or changed to) optional, the agencies' measured performance was comparatively poor (even if participant outcomes changed little). In addition, 100% of W-2 agencies met the requirements for "financial management" (timely audits with no significant findings) and "contract compliance" (with Department Policies and Procedures) that were essential to earn the right of first selection for the 2004-2005 contract period. Overall, these patterns are consistent with the findings of other studies of contractors' responses to performance incentives, which suggest that they will emphasize achieving standards for measures that are given the most weight in contract renewal and funding decisions (Courty & Marschke, 2004; Heinrich, 1999; Heinrich & Lynn 2000) .
Coming back to the question posed earlier, how did the state handle the problem of financial losses and failing contractors during this period, given that most W-2 agencies continued to achieve high levels of performance on the key program/participant outcomes? To cover the first 20% of the shortfall in cash benefits, the state spent money from a $20-million contingency fund. When the state also attempted to shift $11.4 million of the W-2 budget allocation from other providers to those in Milwaukee County, however, it not surprisingly met with intense objections. The plan was instead revised to shift $9.6 million to the Milwaukee agencies (Schultze, 2003b) . These actions clearly reflected the state's primary assumption of the residual rights of control in the contracting relationship, that is, the authority and responsibility to see that W-2 program services were delivered despite these failures or regardless of the costs to the state. But they also implied an abrupt dismissal of the contract terms with the other agencies, and thus, the effective breakdown of the performance-based contracting regime in the subsequent (2004) (2005) contract period seemed a predictable end to this phase of the W-2 program.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
There are some important insights to be drawn from this case study that should be applicable to future contracting decisions in social service programs. First, problems of incomplete contracting arrangements, such as the inability (or poor capability) to fully specify in advance relevant contingencies (changing economic circumstances, legislative mandates, etc.) and the course of action that should follow their occurrence, are unavoidable in the public sector. Thus, the contracting process is likely to be burdened by a significant degree of uncertainty, as exemplified by Wisconsin's need to renegotiate contract terms in the face of changing budget circumstances and caseload fluctuations. Does this imply that states should return to cost reimbursement contracting, which is more likely to give contractors a clear understanding of the total amount of compensation (τ) they will receive and thereby aid their investment and service production decisions? Or alternatively, is it possible for governments to successfully renegotiate and improve contracting arrangements without jeopardizing the delivery of social services?
The case study of Wisconsin is useful in that it allowed us to observe changes in contract specifications and performance measures from one period to the next, as the state worked to improve contract efficiency and strengthen incentives for achieving priority outcomes. For example, the risk premium paid to contractors in the form of unrestricted and restricted profits was reduced after the first period performance results indicated that it was relatively easy for providers to meet the performance requirements. In addition, performance measures were categorized and weights were assigned to them to better convey the states' priorities, and our empirical analyses of agency performance suggested that service providers responded to these signals in allocating their own efforts toward the achievement of these priority performance goals. At the same time, the divergence in assessments of contractors' performance on the earnings gains measure-as computed by the state versus as determined in our regression analysis with W-2 administrative data-corroborates other study findings showing that performance measures (P(e,ε)) tend to be fairly noisy signals of service valueadded (ν(e,ε)), in part because of the difficulty of distinguishing the contributions of service providers (e) to participant outcomes from those of participant characteristics and external factors (ε), that is, from a manager's perspective, the information gleaned from the performance measurement system is likely to provide a more ambiguous picture of the contractors' effectiveness on the more difficult-to-measure dimensions of service quality or value-added (e.g., earnings gains).
This case study also highlighted problems that are likely to arise because of deficiencies in program administration and contract management capacity, which were likely to be the cause in part for the failures and setbacks in performance-based contracting in W-2. Governments must be clear in specifying the roles and responsibilities of entities for the monitoring and oversight of contractor activities and should also allocate sufficient resources for these activities in contract specifications. In addition, there should be a clear separation of responsibilities between those contracted to deliver services and those contracted to monitor service delivery, with sufficient funds allocated for auditing and adequate monitoring processes in place to check the quality of data provided by the contractors. The early W-2 contracts lacked explicit provisions for monitoring activities, and even in the more recent (2004) (2005) contract, one of the firms hired by the state to conduct audits of W-2 contractors was also found to be providing auditing and accounting services to one of the largest (and now failed) W-2 agencies. Similar problems have been reported in other states, including New York, which Sanger (2003, p. 39) described as "notoriously poor" at monitoring, with backlogs in accounting and inadequate assessments of contractor expenditures and performance. Sanger contends that contracting should not be viewed as an opportunity to "offload" administrative functions; significant resources are required to achieve contract compliance and yet will not guarantee it. This Wisconsin case study likewise suggests that successful contracting out of social services will require much larger government investments in these new functions.
On the other hand, there are also some promising signs that organizational learning is taking place in social services contracting. Researchers studying organizational learning have distinguished between "single-loop learning" that encourages changes in organizational processes and allows them "to do the same things better" (Moynihan, 2005, p. 204) , and "double-loop learning" that involves changes in organizational strategies and/or values and the assumptions underlying them. Recent Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development actions to address the W-2 contracting problems suggest that both single-loop and double-loop learning have likely been occurring, as evidenced by the undertaking of a significant structural and management reorganization and new provisions for performancebased contracting in current contract period. The state has now shifted to a 4-year (2006-2009) contract to "promote stability," make more efficient use of administrative funds, and strengthen partnerships with other employment service providers. 19 The state is also increasing "management and financial accountability expectations," in part through the use of new contract incentives that require larger W-2 contractors to "earn" 20% of their administrative and service contract funds through the achievement of specific outcomes, that is, reimbursement of costs is conditional on these program outcomes being met. Perhaps most significant, the state has broken up several of the large Milwaukee contracts and is separately contracting out for W-2 case management, job development and placement, and Supplemental Security Income advocacy activities to allow for greater specialization and competition in-service delivery, improved targeting of services to clients with diverse needs, and performance measures more closely aligned with service objectives. More generally, this case study suggests that as states gain more experience with the contracting process, they will learn to recognize and better handle the trade-offs among key elements in contract design (e.g., risks and rewards, stability and competition, monitoring and discretion), as they strive to improve both performance-based contracting and their social welfare services outcomes.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge several limitations of this study and its generalizability to other settings in which contracting for social services delivery takes place. First, we focused on a single state to facilitate a more in-depth study of the contracting provisions over time, and other states with different political and legislative structures that bear on performance-based contracting processes may have very different experiences in managing and learning from successive contracting efforts. At the same time, it is our hope that by developing the implications of a simple linear contract model to illustrate fundamental challenges in performance-based contracting processes, our framework may be more broadly used to analyze the experiences of other governments.
Another limitation of our case study is that it gives greater attention to the government's side of the contract management activities than to those of the contracted agencies. Exploration of contractors' goals, strategies, and perceptions of contract specifications and management issues would further enhance our understanding of the contracting system and how its design could be improved. Although it was outside the scope of this study to construct measures of the contractors' perceptions of or responses to changes in the W-2 contracting arrangements, there are sources of information that might be useful for future research in this area. For example, a W-2 Contract & Implementation (C&I) Committee and standing and ad hoc C&I work groups prepare reports and issue papers and transmit input from the W-2 agencies into the contracting processes. 20 In addition, future research could pursue questions about how performance incentives influence the behavior of individual actors (agency administrators or case managers), and how their effects vary across public and private agencies with different organizational characteristics or management practices. In addition, one could take advantage of the diverse administrative arrangements of welfare services across states to expand this type of research beyond the Wisconsin case and to further explore and disentangle the relationships between state and local administrative structures and program performance. And to the extent that data are available, larger empirical studies of contracting out/contracting back in like that of Hefetz and Warner (2004) could make a very important contribution to this literature, although indepth comparative case studies could also produce rich insights into these contracting relationships. 
